LITERARY EXPRESSIONS OF AFRICAN SPIRITUALITY

Edited by CAROL P. MARSH-LOCKETT and ELIZABETH J. WEST
"The editors of Literary Expressions of African Spirituality have created a volume that is essential reading for serious scholars of African American literature and culture because its chapters genuinely enhance what we know about African influences on African American cultural production. This work contributes to interdisciplinary approaches to African American literature. In addition, scholars and students of Africana, black diaspora, and black transnational studies, as well as students and scholars of literary and cultural studies, generally, will find it highly relevant. The coeditors' introduction is brilliantly conceived and executed—perfectly setting up the illuminating contributions that follow. I highly recommend it."

—LOVALIERE KING, director, Africana Research Center, Pennsylvania State University

"Exploring the intersection of spirituality and aesthetics in literary texts by African and African-descended writers on the continent and in the Americas, Literary Expressions of African Spirituality offers a new conceptual framework for understanding African and diasporic agency and originality. The essays in this collection challenge, expand, and elaborate on previous conceptions of art, identity, and the African spiritual cosmos."

—ALMA JEAN BILLINGSLEA, professor, Department of English, Spelman College

With a focus on the connected spiritual legacy of the black Atlantic, Literary Expressions of African Spirituality leads the way to more comprehensive transgeographical studies of African spirituality in black art. With essays focusing on African spirituality in creative works by several trans-Atlantic black authors across varying locations in the Ameri-Atlantic diaspora, this collection reveals and examines their shared spiritual cosmology. Diasporic in scope, Literary Expressions of African Spirituality offers new readings of black literatures through the prism of spiritual memory that survived the damaging impact of trans-Atlantic slaving. This memory is a significant thread that has often been missed in the reading and teaching of the literatures of the African diaspora. Essays in this collection explore unique black angles of seeing and ways of knowing that characterize African spiritual presence and influence in trans-Atlantic black artistic productions. Essays exploring works ranging from turn-of-the-century African American figure W. E. B. DuBois, South African novelist Zakes Mda, Haitian novelists Edwidge Danticat and Jacques Roumain's, as well as African belief systems such as Vodoun and Candomble, provide a scope not yet offered in a single published volume. This collection explores the deep and often unconscious spiritual and psychosocial connectedness of people of African descent in the African and Ameri-Atlantic world.

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The Body of Vodou: Corporeality and the Location of Gender in Afro-Diasporic Religion

Roberto Strongman

Recent scientific experiments in the area of perception and cognition present further evidence that the relationship between the self and the body is not a universal given, but imagined and constructed.¹ Out-of-body experiments conducted by two research groups using slightly different methods expanded upon the "rubber hand illusion." In that illusion, people hide one hand in their lap and look at the rubber hand set on a table in front of them. As a researcher strokes the real hand and the rubber at the same time with a stick, people have the sensation that the rubber hand is their own. When a hammer hits the rubber hand, the subjects recoil or cringe. According to the August 2007 issue of Science, two different research teams led by Ehrsson, H. Henrik, and Bigna Lenggenhager created whole-body illusions with similar manipulations, this time through the use of virtual-reality technology. The subjects wear goggles connected to two video cameras placed six feet behind them and, as a result, saw their own backs from the perspective of a virtual person located behind them. When the researcher stroked the subjects' chests and moved the second stick under the camera lenses simultaneously, the subjects reported the sense of being outside of their own bodies, looking at themselves from a distance where the cameras were located. The scientists infer from these experiments that they now understand how the brain combines visual and tactile information to compute and determine where the self is located in space. These experiments are relevant to us in that they help us to understand that the location of the self vis-à-vis the
Clearly, Descartes's concern here is to negate the full absorption of the soul by the body in the process of subjective internalization. The two remain distinct entities, even if one resides within the other. Apart from remarking on Descartes's famous cogito in his description of the "I" as the "thinking thing," we shall note his concern for divisibility and indivisibility as tests for integrity. Descartes believes that the possibility of the body to be separated into parts implies that it is of a different nature than the indivisible mind/soul. In fact, Western philosophy will not be able to develop a discourse for the parts of the mind until the twentieth century with Freud's "The Ego and the Id" and by Sartre, who in L'Être et le néant claims that "L'altérité est, en effet, une négation interne et seule une conscience peut se constituer comme négation interne." [Alterity is, really, an internal negation and only a conscience can constitute itself as an internal negation] (Sartre 666). Nevertheless, through his reasoning, Descartes crystallizes the notion of a self within a body, establishing this self as internal, unitary, and inseparable from the body.

In the twentieth century, a strong Western philosophical current attempts to amend the internal subject of Descartes. Bataille, for example, posits the divine as self inside the body: "J'entends par expérience intérieure ce que d'habitude on nomme expérience mystique: les états d'extase, de ravissement, au moins d'émotion méditative." [By "internal experience" I mean that which normally is called "mystical experience," ecstasies, rap- ture, as a form of mediating emotion] (Bataille 15). Bataille here suggests that even though inwardness initially required secularization, once it is established it can become sacramental once again without forcing the self to exit the body. Similarly, Michel Serres in Variations sur le Corps uses an aesthetic discourse to claim that the body's internalization of the self does not imply a rejection of the profound and transcendental mystery of artistic appreciation:

Voilà les cycles admirables de support réciproque entre le labyrinthe de l'oreille interne, chargé du port, et les olives spirales de l'externe, qui entendent et produisent la musique, convergent dans un centre noir et secret, commun à ses deux réseaux, où je découvre soudain la solution aux mystères sombres de l'union de l'âme qui ouit la langue du corps porteur... [Let's consider the admirable cycles of reciprocal support between the labyrinth of the internal ear and the spiraling corrugations of the external ear, which hears and produces music, converging into one dark and secret center, common to both networks, where I suddenly discover the solution to the shadowy mysteries of the union between the soul that hears language and the body which carries it]. (23)

While Bataille and Serres are interested in recuperating the Divine for the internal self, for Sartre "[l]autre conception de l'altérité reviendrait à la poser comme en-soi, c'est-à-dire à établir entre elle et l'être une relation externe, ce qui nécessiterait la présence d'un témoin pour constater que
"l’autre est autr que l’en-soi" [All other conceptualization of alterity will end up presenting it as in-itself, in other words, to establish between it and Being an external relationship, which would require the presence of a witness to verify that the other is different from that which is in-itself] (666).

In Caliban’s Reason: Introducing Afro-Caribbean Philosophy, Paget Henry explains that Afro-Diasporic philosophy does not exist as a tradition isolated from other manifestations of culture:

Because traditional African philosophy emerged implicitly in the ontological, ethical, existential, and other positions taken in religious, mythic, genealogical, and folkloric discourses, its presence and visibility depend upon the continued vitality and growth of these systems of thought. Their contraction or decay would mean decline and eclipse for traditional African philosophy. (Henry 2000, 43) . . . In the Caribbean . . . traditional African philosophy experienced an even greater eclipse as a result of the rise of colonial discourses and a literate, hybridized local intelligentsia. (45)

Henry’s statement implies the need to investigate Afro-Diasporic religion as a repository of philosophical information that can override the imposition of Western philosophical discourses on colonized peoples. In fact, a thorough study of Afro-Diasporic religions reveals how—unlike the Western idea of the fixed internal unitary soul—the Afro-Diasporic self is removable, external, and multiple. In African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme, Kuame Gyekye presents a tripartite plan of the self comprised of the Honam—the material body—the Okra—the immaterial soul—and the Sunsum—the quasi-material spirit (Gyekye 89). In Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective, Kwasi Wiredu explains Gyekye’s systematization of Akan personhood by comparing it with Descartes’s mind/body binarism:

One thing, in any case, should be absolutely clear: Neither the Okra nor the Sunsum can be identified with the immaterial soul familiar in some influential Western philosophical and religious thinking (with all its attendant paradoxes). This concept of the soul is routinely used interchangeably with the concept of mind while the concept of Okra and Sunsum are categorically different from the Akan concept of mind (adwene), as our previous explanation should have rendered apparent. Thus Descartes (in English translation) can speak indifferently of the soul or the mind and appear to make sense. In Akan to identify either the Okra or the Sunsum with Adwene would be the sheerest gibberish. (129)

The multiplicity of the self displayed in the Akan scheme is prevalent in Western African societies and has been noted by Haitian Vodou scholar Guérin Montilus in his study of Adja philosophy:

The Vodu religion of the Adja taught those same Africans that their psychic reality and source of human life was metaphorically symbolized by the shadow of the body. This principle, represented by the shadow, is called the ye. There are two of these. The first is the inner, the internal part of the shadow, which is called the ye gli; that is, a short ye. The second, the external and light part of the shadow, is called the ye gaga; that is, the long ye. The first ye gli is the principle of physical life, which vanishes at death. The second, ye gaga, is the principle of consciousness and psychic life. The ye gaga survives death and illustrates the principle of immortality. It has metaphysical mobility that allows human beings to travel far away at night (through dreams) or remain eternally alive after the banishment of the ye gli. After death, the ye gaga goes to meet the community of Ancestors, which constitutes the extended family and the clan in their spiritual dimensions. (2)

This multiplicity of the self found in African philosophy survives in the Caribbean Diaspora. The African duality of the immaterial self—the okra and sunsum of the Akan and the ye gli and ye gaga of the Adja—become the tibonanj and the guobonanj in Haitian Vodou. In Creole Religions of the Caribbean: An Introduction from Vodou and Santeria to Obeah and Espiritismo, Margarite Fernández Olmos and Lizabeth Paravisini-Gebert define these two elusive terms:

The head, which contains the two elements that comprise the soul—the ti bánj or ti bon ange (the conscience that allows for self-reflection and self-criticism) and the gwó bánj or gò blond (the psychic, source of memory, intelligence, and personhood)—must be prepared so that the gò blond can be separated from the initiate to allow the spirit to enter in its place. (118)

Here we begin to see that there is a cooperative relationship between the tibonanj and the guobonanj. Alfred Métraux further expounds on this cooperation:

It is the general opinion that dreams are produced by the wanderings of the Gros-bon-ange when it abandons the body of those who sleep. The sleeper becomes aware of the adventures of the Gros-bon-ange through the Tiz’angé who remains by him as a protector and yet never loses sight of the Gros-bon-ange. He wakes the sleeper in case of danger and even flies to the rescue of the Gros-bon-ange if this face real danger. (85)

For the self to achieve altered states of consciousness—in trance possessions, dreams, or death—the tibonanj allows the guobonanj to become detached from the person. In the case of trance possession, the guobonanj surrenders its place and its authority to the mèt tet, “the main spirit served by that person and the one s/he most often goes into trance for” (McCarthy Brown 10).
In her landmark book *Mama Lola: A Vodou Priestess in Brooklyn*, Karen McCarthy Brown further explains the multiple concepts of the self in Vodou by presenting the notion of the *mèt tet*, roughly translated as “the master of the head”:

The personality of the *mèt tet* and that of the devotee tend to coincide, an intimate tie hinted at in the occasional identification of the “big guardian angel” (gwobonanj), one dimension of what might be called a person’s soul, with the Vodou spirit who is his or her *mèt tet*. (112-113)

Here we see how the gwobonanj is the central element of the self in Vodou. Not only is it the seat of individuality but it also maintains links between *mèt tet* and the *tibonanj*, two aspects of the self that are not directly connected to each other. These links are broken after the death of the individual, in the Vodou ceremony of dessounin:

In a certain sense, the mait-tête is the divine parent of the gros-bon-ange, the psychic inheritance from the parents. The ceremony of dessounin thus accomplishes two separate but related actions: it severs the loa cord of the gros-bon-ange; and it separates the gros-bon-ange from its physical parent—the now defunct matter of the body—launching it as an independent spiritual entity into the spiritual universe, where it, in turn, becomes either part of the general spiritual heritage of the descendants of that person, or even, perhaps, the divine parent, the loa mait-tête of some subsequent gros-bon-ange. (Deren 45)

We can summarize the roles of the two most important aspects of the self by saying that the gwobonanj is consciousness, while the *tibonanj* is objectivity. The gwobonanj is the principal soul, experience, personality (Agosto de Muñoz), the personal soul or self (Deren 44). The *tibonanj* is described as the anonymous, protective, objective conscience that is the truthful and objective, the impersonal spiritual component of the individual (Deren 44), whose domain also encompasses moral considerations and judgment (Agosto de Muñoz 52). The *tibonanj* is a “spiritual reserve tank. It is an energy or presence within the person that is dimmer or deeper than consciousness, but it is nevertheless there to be called upon in situations of stress and depletion” (McCarthy Brown 9).

The complex relationship between the gwobonanj and the *tibonanj* has at times not been correctly understood by Western scholars, who have disseminated erroneous information, further muddling our collective understanding of the self in Vodou. For example, Desmangles ascribes to the *tibonanj* characteristics that most scholars attribute to the gwobonanj: “the ti-bon-anj is the ego-soul. It represents the unique qualities that characterize individual’s personality” (67). Comparisons to Western philosophy underscore his confusion:

The Vodou concept of the ti-bon-anj in heaven seems to correspond to the Roman Catholic doctrine of the soul, for Vodouisants believe that it “appears” before Bondye to stand before the heavenly tribunal where it is arraigned for its misdeeds, and must suffer the appropriate penalties. (69)

Similarly, Wade Davis ascribes to the *tibonanj* attributes that most scholars use to define the gwobonanj: “the Ti bon ange [is] the individual, the aura of the source of all personality and willpower” (185). Furthermore, Davis says that the *tibonanj* travels during sleep (182), while most scholars agree that it is the gwobonanj who does so (McCarthy Brown 9; Montlülis 4).

In addition to the gwobonanj, *tibonanj*, and the *mèt tet*, there remain three components of Vodou concept of personhood. The *num* is the “spirit of the flesh that allows each cell to function” (Davis 185) or “the animating force of the body” (McCarthy Brown 8). The *zetal* is the “celestial parallel self, fate” (McCarthy Brown 9) and the “spiritual component that resides in the sky” it is “the individual’s star of destiny” (Davis 185). The *kôr kadan* is “the body itself, the flesh and blood” (Davis 185), “the dead body of a person” and “a material substance separable from these various animating spiritual entities” (McCarthy Brown 9).

The phenomenon of trance possession needs to be explained through the multiplicity of the self in Vodou. The projection of Western philosophical concepts by anthropologists onto Vodou has been responsible for inaccurate understandings of trance possession: ‘The symptoms of the opening phase of the trance are clearly pathological. They conform exactly in their main features, to the stock clinical conception of hysteria’ (Métraux 120). Nevertheless, it is important to note how other scholars from the Haitian national elite have questioned the use of Western philosophy to understand Afro-Diasporic trance possession:

Quoiqu’il en soit, si le phénomène de la possession—la transe ou l’état d’esprit... (Mars 128)

However, even as Métraux inaccurately equates trance possession with the already questionable notion of “hysteria,” he does provide one of the clearest definitions of this phenomenon during the 1950s, the early period of serious scholarly investigation on Vodou:

The explanation of mystic trance given by disciples of Vodoo is simple: a loa moves into the head of an individual having first driven out “the good big angle” (gros bon ange)—one of the two souls everyone
carries in himself. This eviction of the soul is responsible for the tremblings and convulsions that characterize the opening stages of trance. Once the good angel has gone, the person possessed experiences a feeling of total emptiness as though he were fainting. His head whirls, the calves of his legs tremble; he now becomes not only the vessel but also the instrument of the god. From now on it is the god’s personality and not his own which is expressed in his bearing and words. The play of these features, his gestures and even the tone of his voice all reflect the temperament and character of the god who has descended upon him.

(Métraux 120)

Métraux’s quote is helpful in that it helps us to locate the seat of selfhood in the corporeal head of the individual. In Haitian Kreyòl, tèt has an interesting double meaning. It is a noun referring to the anatomical “head” and, in its function as a reflexive prefix attached to personal pronouns, it also means “self.” This synecdoche becomes important as it establishes the head as a referent for selfhood, in part-for-whole metaphor. It also presents the head as the physical location for the multiple parts of the self. Writing in the interstices between African and European philosophies, Métraux describes trance possession using an ambiguous language implying penetration and hovering. This vacillation between metaphors for possession continues in the following quote:

“The relationship between the loa and the man seized is compared to that which joins a rider to his horse. That is why a loa is spoken of as mounting or saddling his chival (horse). . . . It is also an invasion of the body by a supernatural spirit; hence the often-used expression: “the loa is seizing his horse.” (120)

Métraux’s use of in/out metaphors for the phenomenon of possession is a Western importation. The rider metaphor popularized by early scholars of Vodou like Zora Neale Hurston in Tell my Horse (1937) and Katherine Dunham in Island Possessed (1969) articulates the language used by the initiates themselves.

Afro-Diasporic religions operate under a transcorporeal conceptualization of the self that is radically different from the Western philosophical tradition. Unlike the unitary soul of Descartes’s, the immaterial aspect of the Afro-Diasporic self is multiple, external, and removable. These various subjectivities rest upon a concave corporeal surface reminiscent of a saddle or a calabash.

What are the possible implications for gender in a modular system in which the self can be substituted temporarily by a subjectivity of another gender? Some of these gender implications of Afro-Diasporic transcorporeality are evident in René Depestre’s novel, Hadriana dans tous me rêves. In this, Hadriana—a white French woman living in Haiti—is turned into a zombi on her wedding day and becomes the leader of a Vodou community. Martin Munro sees in Hadriana’s whiteness “obvious traces of De-

pestre’s francophilia” (Munro 127). But, claiming that Hadriana might embody a “reversal of colonial eroticization of its tropical other,” he also concedes that there might be an element of resistance in Depestre’s idealization of Hadriana’s beauty (Munro 127). Her aborted marriage begins a non-heteronormative characterization of Hadriana that continues throughout her spiritual evolution. At the outset of the text Hadriana is associated with Nana Buruku, a lwa that is often represented as embodying a primordial androgynous gender:

Incapables d’admettre l’arrêt du cœur qui a terrassé Nana au pied de l’autel, des Jacmilens à l’imagination néophyte ont réincorporé leur fille à un conte des fées. La disparition de son corps du sépulcre était l’épisode qui menait à son terme ce rite dans un imaginaire aux prises avec la peur de la mort. [The people of Jacmel, unable to accept that a heart attack brought Nana down to the foot to of the altar, used their necrophilic imagination to reinsert their daughter into a fairy tale. Her body’s disappearance from the sepulcher was the catalyst for such a leap from the fear of death into fantasy.] (Depestre 99)

At the end of the novel, she is associated with a male deity of springs “J’étais Simbi-la-Source. Les dieux de vaudou m’auraient chargée de con
voyer à la Jamaïque une poignée d’émigrants de la région de Jacmel.” [I was Simbi-the-Spring. The gods of Vodou ordered me to take a handful of emigrants from Jacmel to Jamaica.] (Depestre 207). The regendering see in Hadriana’s transmutation into various deities is also evident in the powerful trance a Mambo experiences at another point in the text: “Dès les premières mesures de danse, saint Jacques le Majeur, chef de la
famille des Ogou, monta le cheval Brévica Losange. Aussitôt possédée, la Mambo improvisa une chanson en harmonie avec les batteries” [From the first notes of the dance, Saint James the Greater—the first in the family of the Oguns—mounted Brévica Losange as his horse. In that manner possessed, the Mambo improvises a song in harmony with the drums.] (Depestre 77). This female Vodou priestess’ identification with one of the most virile of lwas demonstrates how the substitution of the gwobonay by the mét tet of another gender can have as a result the Vodou lisan’s corporeal regendering.

In addition to her association with Nana Buruku and Simbi-la-Source, Hadriana is constantly associated with yet another lwa: Gédé, whose domain is life and death. Although his demeanor is humorous, he is known for speaking harsh truths. His portrayal as an undertaker is enhanced by his top hat. His eyeglasses have only one lens, implying vision in this world and the next. His walking cane is a phallic, acquiring a transcorporeal aspect in the hands of his female devotees. Hadriana’s death is presented as the responsibility of this lwa: “Un homme à l’allure de Baron-Samedi invitait des guérets présents à ses côtés à prendre le cercueil des mains apostoliques qui le portent” [A man with a resem-
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robes de satin vert des oreillers et des coussins. Ils avaient des poitrines et des fesses de vénus callipyges. En appui sur des gourdis, les travestis bavardenaient avec des personnages enveloppés dans des draps blancs. [T]opped in front of a group of men disguised as women. In order to simulate an advanced state of pregnancy, they placed pillows under their satin dresses. They had breasts and buttocks fit for Venus Callipyges. Supported by staffs, the cross-dressers charted with people dressed in white clothes.] (Depestre 59-60)

Edouard Glissant presents this tradition as one of the few places in which West Indian society is able to critique patriarchal heteronormativity:

Il est une occasion en Martinique où hommes et femmes se rencontrent d'accord pour donner une semblable représentation de leurs rapports; c'est dans la coutume des mariages burlesques du Carnaval, critique de la structure familiale. L'homme y tient le rôle de l'époux (le plus souvent enceinte) et la femme celui de l'époux; un adulte y tient le rôle d'un enfant au berceau...

Il n'est pas surprenant que le mariage burlesque soit une des rares formes encore vivaces de ce grand questionnement populaire et collectif qu'était et que ne peut plus être le carnaval martiniquais. [There is an occasion in Martinique in which men and women meet in order to give a symbolic representation of their relationship. This is the tradition of the burlesque marriages during carnival, a critique of family structure. The man has the role of the wife (often pregnant) and the woman that of the husband; an adult has the role of an infant in a crib. ... It is not surprising that the burlesque marriage is one of the rare forms still alive of that great popular and collective questioning that can be none other than the Martinican carnival.] (299)

Glissant’s Martinican context prevents him from considering Haitian Vodou as yet another site in which West Indian societies are able to question the dictates of gender and sexual norms. However, this Martinican perspective enables us to consider the ways in which this transcorporeality extends beyond the religious and permeates the entire structure of West Indian society, even of those that have become been greatly Europeanized as a result of departmentalization.

That the representation of West Indian society in Depestre is suffused with exoticism has not gone unnoticed by literary critics. In an effort to redeem Depestre’s work, Michael Munro reminds us “Exoticism is not, not always, a product of the hegemonic gaze. The processes of mass exile from the Caribbean have rendered the dualistic center-periphery concept of hegemony over more redundant (Munro 134). In other words, we could read Depestre’s exoticism as stemming from a deep nostalgia and as catharsis for the loss and separation from his native Haiti as a result of his exile in France.

Likewise, unlike the Western idea of the body as the enclosure of the soul, the kor kadan is an open vessel that finds metaphoric and aesthetic
expression in the Kuv, gouv, and kanari containers of Haitian Vodou. As Thompson explains, one of the most arresting sights for a newcomer into an Afro-Diasporic religious setting is the collection and assortment of ritual containers:

The close gathering of numerous bottles and containers, on various tiers, is a strong organizing principle in the world of vodun altars. That unifying concept, binding Haitian Rada altars to Dahomean altars in West Africa, precisely entails a constant elevation of a profusion of pottery upon a dais, an emphasis on simultaneous assuagement (the liquid in vessels) and exaltation (the ascending structure of the tiers).

(182)

In fact, some of the most striking art objects of the African diaspora are anthropomorphic receptacles, as noted by Falgayrettes-Leveau, in his exhibit book Réceptacles: “Les Kuba et les peuples apparentés du Zaïre ont privilégié de façon presque systématique, mais avec raffinement, la représentation de la tête dans la conception des plus beaux de leurs réceptacles: le cocupes à boire le vin de palme” [The Kuba and their kin in Zaïre have privileged an almost codified, yet refined, manner the representation of the head in crafting the most beautiful of their receptacles: the cups for drinking palm wine.] (Falgayrettes-Leveau 32). These cephalomorphic receptacles emblematize the function of the head—and through synecdoche, the body—as an open container. This association of the head with such ritual containers is evident in the use of a specific receptacle called pò tets, literally “container heads”:

This part of the initiation also involves the preparation of the pò tets, as containers for the new selves, repositories for ingredients symbolic of the new union of spirit and human being: hair, sacrificial food, herbs, and oils. When the initiates join the community for their presentation as oungis, they walk with these pots balanced on their heads and place them in the altar, as symbol of their entering the community as initiated oungis. (Fernández Olmos 118-9)

This representation of the head as an open vessel becomes evident in the association between the material body and various types of ritual containers in Depestre’s Hadriana:

J’étais saisi de violentes convulsions internes. Tous mes os vibraient à se rompre. J’ai sombré dans un cauchemar à l’intérieur de mon cauchemar. J’étais un âme vouée. On a séparé mon petit bon ange de mon gros bon ange. On a enfermé le premier dans une calebasse pour l’emmenner à dos de mule dans un pénitencier d’âmes dans la montagne du Haut-Cap-Rouge. Le second, le bras liés derrière les dos, a été poussé à coups de fouet comme un âne, dans une direction opposée. Tout lien a été rompu entre mes deux formes d’être. [I was overcome by violent internal convulsions. All my bones vibrated until they almost cracked. I was in a nightmare inside a nightmare. I was a stolen soul. They separated my tibonanji from my gwobonanji. They had enclosed the first in a calabash to take it by mule back to a penitentiary of souls in the mountains of Haut-Cap-Rouge. The second, arm tied behind his back, was flagellated like an ass in the opposite direction. All links were broken between my two forms of being.] (175)

Here it is possible to see Depestre’s important depiction of the African multiple self. Through this quote we also become aware of the ways in which aspects of the self might be removable without producing the individual’s death. It is also significant how Depestre presents the calabash as one of the receptacles that may be used as substitute for the human body.

Davis explains how the separation of the corporeal and immaterial aspects of the self that Depestre describes constitute the phenomenon of zombification:

The spirit zombi, or the zombie of the ti bon ange alone, is carefully stored in a jar and may later be magically transmuted into insects, animals, or humans in order to accomplish the particular work of the bokor. The remaining spiritual components of man, the n’âme, the gros bon ange, and the z’etoile, together form the zombi cadaver, the zombi of the flesh. (186)

This very detached description of the process of zombification is consistent with Davis’s clinical view of zombification as purely the result of neurotoxin poisoning (Davis 7). However, for Depestre, zombification has much more emotive connotations associated to loss of autonomy and spiritual imprisonment:

Ce lieu de détention a été aménagé pour recevoir les âmes embouteillées des chrétiens-vivants condamnées à une peine privative de liberté spirituelle. Le régime cellulaire consiste à mettre en bouteilles l’imaginaire des individus changés en morts-vivants. Les bouteilles que vous allez voir sont des oublies en verre, cristal, métal, faïence, cuir, bois, grès. [This place of detention was prepared to receive the bottled up souls of people condemned to a privation of their spiritual liberty. The practice consisted in bottling up the imaginary of individuals who have become living dead. The bottles that you will see are little forgotten things in glass, crystal, metal, ceramic, leather, wood, and stoneware!] (175)

Through these passages we see that Depestre, like Davis, conceives the tibonanji as the principal soul and the seat of individuality. However, this view is incongruent with the work of other scholars, who believe that “[the famous zombies are people whose Gros-bon-ange has been captured by some evil hungan, thus becoming living-dead. (Métraux 87)] Moreover, apart from zombification, there are various forms of spiritual embettlement, all of which involve the capturing of the gwobonanji, not the
tibounaj. For instance, when the individual willingly decides to bottle up part of his self, it is the gwobonanj:

A certain amount of immunity against witchcraft may be obtained by requesting an hun Kan to extract the Gros-bon-ange from the body and to enclose it in a bottle. The soul, removed from its bodily envelope, may either be hidden or buried in a garden or entrusted to the hun Kan for safekeeping. (Métaxu 86)

While this procedure protects the gwobonanj, it does not prevent bodily damage to the material body from which it proceeds. This creates a potentially dangerous scenario in which people who have sustained severe bodily injury—either through spells or accidents—will beg to have their gwobonanj liberated from the bottle, and end their corporeal suffering through death.

The gwobonanj must be ritually removed from the person’s head shortly after death through the ceremony of desounnen, in which

The Oungan calls the spirit, or in some cases the name of the dead, then removes the lwa and puts it in a pitcher or bottle, called a goni. In death, the link between the spirit and its human vessel must be broken, so that the individual’s spirit can move beyond death, and beyond revenge, joining the ancestors under the waters in the mythical place called Ginen (Guinea). (Dayan 261)

Then, a year and day after death, the gwobonanj is called up from the water in a ceremony referred to as rele mò nan dlo [calling the dead from the water] and installed in a goni clay pot (McCarthy Brown 8).

Depestré and Davis are correct in their assessment of zombification as constituting the embollement of one part of the self. However, they are mistaken by saying that this part is the tibounaj, since this and other types of spiritual embollements involve the containment of the gwobonanj. Beyond noticing these important discrepancies, what is important for us here is to consider that no matter what aspect of the self is bottled, according to all of these authors, any type of hermetic enclosing of the self is seen as potentially dangerous or associated with death. The fact that one of the most dreaded Afro-Diasporic states of being should be so similar to the Cartesian view of the hermetically sealed soul points to the contestatory and critical relationship between these two philosophical traditions. Curiously, the zombified body of Haitian Vodou bears striking similarities with the body without organs that Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari elaborate in L’Anti-Oedipe:

Instinct de mort, tel est son nom. Car le désir desire aussi cela, la mort, parce que le corps plein de la mort est son moteur immobile, parce que les organes de la vie sont la working machine...

Le corps sans organes n’est pas le témoin d’un néant originel, pas plus que le reste d’une totalité perdue. Il n’est surtout pas une projection; rien à voir avec le corps propre, ou avec un image du corps. C’est le corps sans image. Lui, l’improductif... Le corps sans organes est de l’anti-production. [Death instinct, that is his name. Since the desire desires also that, death, because the body full of death is an immobile motor, because life’s organs are the working machine. The body without organs is not the witness of an original nothingness, not any more than the remains of a lost totality. It is not a projection; it has nothing to do with the body itself or the image of the body. It is the body without an image. Him, the unproductive... the body without organs is anti-production.]

(Deleuze 15)

In this sense, both the Western and African view of personhood can be seen to coincide. By presenting the most abject state of being as that of the body that is deprived of its immaterial elements—organs, gwobonanj—both traditions present an image of the exploited, enslaved, unremunerated and incomplete worker. Descartes’ body-as-clockwork and Vodou’s kòr kàdou are more similar than previously thought.

One of the gwobonanj kept by the bokòr is that of a same-sex-loving male artist: “Dans le siphon d’eau de selz est détenu un peintre macici” [There is a queer painter imprisoned in the salt water syphon] (Depestré 176). While Fanon insists in Peau Noire, Masques Blancs that there is no homosexuality in the West Indies (Fanon 146), other French West Indian writers such as Depestré and Franketienné present same sex desire as intrinsic to the region. Franketienné’s Kreyòl novel Adjounoumelozo utilizes the voice of Gédé—the jocular Vodou Iwa of life, death, overflowing sexuality, and bawdiness—to speak openly about the important role that queers play in Vodou:

Papa Gédé trase vèvè ak tètètèn pou bòl plezi sou fey papey. Li jwe ak mo jan li pitò. Li koud mo, brase mo, bowde mo. Li tay mo gangans pou abiy pawòl bòxò, dékòre fraz ak bòl dantèl chèlè. Papa Gédé pa gen pwoblem ni lafontèt ni lakrentif pou di sa li wè, sa li tande, sa li santi, Papa Gédé draw cosmograms with small fine letters for his pleasure on sheets of paper. He plays with words. He sows words. He soldiers words. He dresses words and phrases in decorative lace. Papa Gédé has no problem or shyness to say that which he sees, hears or knows.

(12)

Gédé’s lack of shame allows the articulation of an erotic of women-loving-women that turns “madevinz” from derogatory epithet into passionate poetic embellishment: “Lang zo dòbou lemant bobon lakanyèl. Odè chalè divinité lavoutele mivadiniv sou madivinbouch louvrì chemon ozannanna li mitan pwèl jòf latoudlin mèt’m sou sa” [The smell of the divinity along the celestial route of the rainbow, dye-route, dye-mouth, open up the path as if cutting through the middle of a pineapple] (249).

Similarly, Gédé’s voice in Franketienné’s Adjounoumelozo locates the source of sexual desire of men for men in the phallus of Dambala, the snake god. Paralleling his earlier beautification of “madevinz,” Frank-
tienne explains the effeminacy of the “masisi” as divine in nature, coming about through male devotion to Lasirenn. Frankétienne writes:


In fact, Frankétienne’s spiralist word play leads us to the origins of the word Masisi in the Fon language of Benin and Togo:

Mami Wata is about fertility, feminality, and beauty. Mostly women become Mamisis; men who become Mamisis are particularly good-looking and often dress and plait their hair like women. (Rosenthal 118)

The African counterpart of Haitian Lasirenn is Mami Wata, whose initiates, Mamisis—read: Masisis—embody the femininity of the deity. The Fon term for initiates of the sea goddess becomes in Haiti a referent to male homosexuality.

While Frankétienne’s Adjanoumelezo honors the full pantheon of Vodou laws—“Alapòt chwal dambala soule lan kalfou demanbre. Pou rive pi wo pi lwen, nou mande atibonlegba louvri bary nou. N’ap file glise desann lan dife ogoun, lan van liko. N’ap chire dlo simbi andezo” [Damba’s horse is on at the crossroads, torn apart. In order to go higher and farther, we ask Legba to open the barrier for us. We glide and descend into the fire of Ogum. We are troubling Simbi’s water] (60)—Cèdè and Lasirenn occupy a primordial role in the narrative, the first because of this unbridled sexuality and the second because of her associations to same-sex loving male initiates. You have other spirits, other selves around you. They come to greet you. Lasirenn introduces you to your family.

In Anne Lescot and Laurence Magloire’s film, Des Hommes et Dieux, masisis owe their desire not to Lasirenn, but to Ezili Danto—the eternal mother spirit and a lwa who some consider to be a lesbian (René & Houlberg 299). With the backdrop of marketplaces, hair saloons, Vodou temples, sacred waterfalls, and dance clubs in Haiti, this groundbreaking film gives voice to a range of Haitian masisis, most whom explain their same sex desire as stemming from their spiritual connection to Dantò. There is Blondine, who sells tobacco snuff in the Port-au-Prince street market, as passersby mock him for his effeminate demeanor, appearance,
ought to have been: What accounts for the large numbers of people who are non-heteronormative in these religions? Such a question would have likely yielded a fruitful exploration on the non-binary quality of Vodou, a multiplicity beyond the dualism of maleness and femaleness, and an elucidation of how the phenomenon of possession allow cross-gender identifications.

Unlike the Western idea of a unitary self that is fixed within the body, the African diasporic philosophical-religious tradition conceives the body as a porcupine, unrolling a self that is removable, external, and multiple. Allowing for a wider range of subjectivities than the more rigid Western model, the modular African Diasporic discourse of personhood becomes a vehicle for the articulation of non-compliant identities that are usually constrained by normative heteropatriarchy. Haitian literary works like René Depestre's [text not legible], Frankétienne's Adjanoumelezo, and filmic ones like Lescaut and Magloire's Des Hommes et Dieux illustrate this modular and transcorporeal view of the African Diasporic self in their representations of trance possession, uses of ritual containers, and the phenomenon of zombification.

NOTES

1. Magloire and Lescaut's representation of masi culture is a palliative to its depiction in "Imagining Heaven," the introduction to Sacred Arts of Haitian Vodou. In this introductory essay, Donald Cosentino uses Susan Sontag's "Notes on Camp" to make a facile connection between Vodou trance and gay balls when he says that "Trance possession may also be seen as a kind of vogue of the divinities" (Cosentino 55). However, this is an erroneous interpretation. Trance is more than putting on clothes and it is certainly not drag. The concept of "realness" popularized in Jenny Livingston’s film Paris is Burning is dependent on impersonation, passing, parodying, and cross-dressing, but this is certainly not the case of trance possession in Vodou—Cosentino suggests. The transcendental and life-transforming act of a Haitian masi being ridden by a lwa cannot be compared with black gay men in Brooklyn enacting a simulacrum of fashion runway shows. This conflation of the sacred and profane obscures what is at the core of both events.

2. All Translations are my own.

WORKS CITED


